1. India was created as a democratic and

1.      Brief History of the Conflict

In the late 1940s, when the two competing nationalist for India and
Pakistani failed to reach accommodation, Britain decided to partition its
Indian empire. The role of dividing the empire was on the hands of a British
representative-Viceroy Lord Mountbatten. He facilitated creation of a Muslim
subcontinent, Pakistani. The state of Pakistani was formed with two flanks
(eastern and western) separated by 1500 miles of the new states of India. The
main aim was to establish a region to be occupied by Muslims in the British
India. The origins of Indo-Pakistani conflict over the disputed territory of
Jammu and Kashmir are complex, rooted in the process of British colonial
withdrawal from the sub-continent. Kashmir posed a distinct problem and from the
time it was established there have been serial conflicts. It
contains a severe disagreement between at least two sides, where their demands
cannot be met by the same resources at the same time. This is an incompatibility.
Incompatibility appears to be a key to the existence of conflict. Kashmir situation was more complex because it had a Muslim majority
(about 80 percent), a border with Pakistani, and a Hindu ruler. They had to
choose to accede to one of the two countries depending on their geographical
position and their religious composition. India was created as a democratic and
secular state and Prime minister insisted that minorities in particular
religious communities had to be protected. He was personally committed to
secularism and felt that Kashmir had to be part of India as demonstration of
India’s commitment to its secularist and diverse identity. For Pakistani,
partition would be considered incomplete without the rallying of this Muslim
majority in a territory next to Pakistani. On the other hand, the Hindu monarch
of Jammu and Kashmir-Maharaja Hari Sighn did not wish to join either India or
Pakistani; he wanted to remain independent. He feared that the democratic prime
minister in India would fire him from powers. He could not also join Pakistani
because during his rule he did nothing to make the lives of Muslims better. The
collision of these two visions led to the first Kashmir war, also known as
Indo-Pakistan war of 1947. In late 1947, the newly created states of India and Pakistan went to war
over the valley of Kashmir. The United Nations brokered ceasefire divided the
state into Indian and Pakistani controlled territories, and resolved that a
referendum would be held in which the people of Kashmir would be able to choose
to join either country. The referendum has not been held to this day. India
granted its portion of Kashmir a special status within its constitution,
allowing for a great degree of self-autonomy. However, successive Kashmiri
governments have been dissolved by the government of India, and elections have
only been held in the presence of its armed forces. In 1965, Pakistan and India
waged a second indecisive war over Kashmir. In the 1980s, resistance within
Kashmir itself against the Indian government took on a violent nature, with
guerilla attacks against Indian army bases. India responded with heavy army
clampdowns, and since then the situation has only escalated and get worse. It
is estimated that well over 34,000 people have died within the valley, and the
relations between the two countries have become increasingly acrimonious. India
blames Pakistan for the militant uprising, claiming Islamabad is supporting
cross border terrorism. Pakistan responds that it merely provides diplomatic
and moral support arguing, furthermore, that India’s history of human rights
abuses in the valley is to blame. With both countries now in possession of
nuclear arms; the recent war in Cargill and the increasing number of civilian
deaths, refugees, and other human rights issues within Kashmir, the conflict
seems to be taking on a more serious nature. In this paper I will discuss the
Kashmir conflict in some depth, examining the problem in its historical context
and assessing whether there is sufficient political will at present to resolve
the dispute.

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2. The Disputants and Their
Views of the Conflict

The truth is that as an international issue Kashmir has
come to the fore because of two reasons: one, because it involves two nuclear
states and two, because of the ground situation in the disputed Kashmir region.
The Indian leadership can’t walk away from this reality. India can’t hope to
continue repression in Kashmir and yet pursue dialogue over Kashmir with
Pakistan.
India’s political aims in Kashmir may be served better by patiently
strengthening the current political and military leadership in Pakistan in its
fight against all forms of religious extremism than by pushing it to the entire
well. The fight against extremisms and bigotry, and their terrorist
manifestations, is a common Pakistan India venture. Pakistan, ever since its inception,
has been proclaiming a right on the territory of Kashmir. Indeed Jinnah argued
that “the new nation would be incomplete without Kashmir…and the ‘K’ in
Pakistan stood for Kashmir,” While we hear Pakistan’s commitment to help the
poor Kashmir, time and again and how the Pakistani side want self determination
for the people of Kashmir, however Pakistan doesn’t seem to hold a very fixed
and coherent approach as to how to tackle the problem. Every ruling party seems
to reiterate the same passionate diatribes done before by the previous parties;
the only difference is that every party has a different way to approach this
issue and present it to the emotional masses. The Kashmir policy suffers from
systematic flaws and has almost a chaotic, erratic feel about it. There has
been no visible structured Pakistani policy to work out a resolution for this
cause. The decision to use certain religious groups as proxy to handle the
interests of the Kashmir people has done more chaos than anything for their
benefit. Thomas P. Thornton elaborates, “The Taliban, for its part, had
essentially been created and brought to power by Pakistan and other Jihad
remnants…were supplying many of the shock troops of the Islamist rebellion
within Indian-held Kashmir.” It seemed like a brilliant plan, as the Pakistani
Army saw it. Pervez Hoodbhoy narrates it as “The strategy now was to wage war
by proxy…Low cost way to win Kashmir by bleeding India.” But this allowed the
struggle of the people of the Kashmir to be termed as something extremist-
like, dangerous to India and it also gave a chance to India to label Kashmiri
Movement as a threat to its defense and thus, its right to prevent any such
future incidents. India did intensify its firings on the villages of Kashmir by
justifying how it was trying to prevent Pakistan trained militants from taking
over Kashmir and entering its territory. Pakistan claims Kashmir to be part of
its territory but the fact that the Kashmiri militants are seen as extremists
and rebels are putting the Kashmiri cause behind the scene since the
international community has been projected with the image that the Kashmiri
Movement is dangerous and needs to be smothered, thus the peaceful image of the
innocent Kashmiri people being slaughtered in cold blood with their struggle
for freedom has been projected in a more violent, vile way and has little
sympathy from the International front. Jonah Blank puts it into simple words as
to what the two nations view regarding Kashmir: “Politicians in both capitals
see only the Kashmir they desire to see: for Pakistanis, a Muslim land pining
to join its Islamic neighbor and welcoming the intervention of mujahedeen; for
Indians, a state ravaged by terrorism and sedition but now largely brought
under control. Both visions are clouded by self-delusion.” 

With
the decades old conflict still unresolved, both the countries have spent ample
amount of their finances and resources over this.

3.     
Attempts for Resolving the Conflict and
the Mechanism for Resolution of the Conflict

The record of the international mediation
(Third Party role), or meditative interventions in regard to the Kashmir
dispute are clearly mixed: These interventions achieved both some successes and
some failures. Among the successes were the cease-fire and truce agreements,
arranged by UNCIP in 1948 and 1949.The cease-fire agreement did not hold for
long and peacekeeping operation that
emerged from it failed in large measure to keep the peace. But that failure can
hardly be charged exclusively against the United Nations. Among the UN’s
failures were the several attempts to mediate the Kashmir dispute by UN
representatives between 1950 and 1958. Since the latter date, in no case has mediation
been applied specially and explicitly to the Kashmir dispute. British mediation
of the 1965 Ran of Kutch crisis between Pakistan and India brought about a
cease-fire agreement on 30 June 1965.However, that agreement, which was
followed in February 1968 by the successful international arbitration of the
Sind-Kutch boundary, applied only to a dispute stretch of the International
border between India and Pakistan. In January 1966, the Soviet Union
successfully mediated an indo-Pakistan agreement (The Tashkent Declaration) on
cease-fire and restoration of peaceful relations, thus providing a formal
ending to the 1965 war. This agreement provided for little more, however than
restoration of the territorial status quo ante. It stated that Kashmir dispute
has been discussed and that each side had set forth its respective position in
regard to this dispute, but there were no provisions for its amelioration.

From the beginning of the Kashmir conflict,
international involvement has been looked upon with a certain amount of
suspicion by both Pakistan and India. Pakistan, in particular, had very little
to show for their reliance on world sympathies save for a rather diluted and
ambiguous international commitment to the “self-determination” of
Kashmir. Nevertheless, it has long been clear that Pakistan government, the
holder of the weaker hand in the Kashmir conflict, has been far more willing
than its India to gamble on international involvement.

Third party mediation is what is being referred to
increasingly in this connection and the state that is being cited, as the third
party mediator is of course the United States of America. Yet this is a
non-starter. India will not concede to direct US intervention on Kashmir since
it sees itself as a contending great power. Even from the Pakistani
perspective, the US is not a suitable third party
mediator because it has its own strategic interests in this region and India is
becoming critical to these interests

United Nations made to reconcile the conflict between
India and Pakistan, its successes and failures, the causes behind the failures,
and the prospects for the future. I will attempt to show that the UN failed to
bring about a lasting solution to the problem because the UN has very limited
abilities when the parties to a conflict have very differing views and are
unwilling to compromise on their positions. Even diplomatic efforts under
Chapter VI of the UN Charter by major
powers interested in the conflict’s resolutions are insufficient in cases where
the powers are unable and/or unwilling to exert a lot of pressure on both
parties to give and take. The UN has more powers under Chapter VII, but such
involvement requires a level of commitment on the part of major players in the
UN which is rarely seen, and in the case of military middle powers such as
Pakistan and India, the use of brute force is never really an option. Under UN
mediation, a ceasefire was agreed upon on January 1 1949. It is important to
note here that the original petitioner to the UN was India. However, the later
delaying tactics and disregard to the UN process may lead to the conclusion
that India used the Security Council apparatus to obtain a temporary respite in
the military campaign that was not going according to her liking, and once its
military forces were firmly established in the region, it saw little need to
continue a serious debate over the Kashmir issue at the UN. Of course, the
Indian side accuses Pakistan of using the US to cut its own military losses.
The fact of the matter remains that the perception of both sides is that the UN
was a mechanism used to further their own narrow national interests, and that
the other side was playing the same game

In 1950, the UNCIP-a body whose members often could not
agree among themselves was replaced by a single UN Representative, the first of
whom was an Australian, Owen Dixon. Dixon soon concluded that there was little
hope of reaching agreement on demilitarization of the entire state. He
therefore took a new approach in his report, submitted to the Security Council
in 1950 that of holding regional plebiscites. Dixon put forward two main
proposals: 1) holding a plebiscite through the entire state, one region at a
time, or 2) only holding a plebiscite in regions which were doubtful those that
would definitely vote for accession to India or Pakistan would be allocated
to those countries without a vote. The latter plan, in effect, confined a
plebiscite to just the Vale of Kashmir. Confident that Sheikh Abdullah could
secure the Valley for India, Nehru favored the
second plan; for the same reason Pakistan rejected it (though officially the
claimed it was because the State should be considered as a whole; it could not
be partitioned). Following Dixon’s failure,
the UN tried twice more to get India and Pakistan to agree on conditions for
holding a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. Frank Graham was appointed UN
representative in 1951, he stayed in the post until 1953__and Gunnar jarring in
1957. Both were unsuccessful

The 1965 armed conflict between India and Pakistan was
formally brought to an end by signing the
Declaration at Tashkent, the capital of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the
Soviet Union. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan signed
it on behalf of their respective countries in the presence of the Soviet
Premier Alexi Kosygin who mediated between them Even before hostilities had
started, on 20 August 1965, Kosygin offered to act as mediator in negotiations
between Pakistan and India. At the time both the parties had rejected this
offer. However. When it was repeated on 17 September with Tashkent suggested as
a possible meeting place, Shastri accepted almost immediately, and Ayub Khan
some months later (on 25 November). Talks between Kosygin, Shastri and Ayub
Khan were scheduled to start in Tashkent on 3 January 1966.Initially, and
indeed until virtually the last moment there was little hope of the talks
generating any kind of agreement- the two both parties’ positions were simply
too far apart. However both India and Pakistan perhaps realized that failure in
Tashkent could result in renewed hostilities, with unpredictable consequences.
Hence on 10 January they did sign an agreement the Tashkent Declaration. This
was less an agreement ending the Kashmir dispute, as one allowing it to be
pushed to one side so that the two countries could resume relatively normal
relations

The
Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that all
armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 25
February 1966 to the positions they held prior to 5 August 1965, and both sides
shall observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire. The Tashkent Declaration
faced domestic opposition in both India and Pakistan. Despite domestic
opposition, both sides did respect the terms of the Declaration at least as far
as practical measures were concerned. Prisoners-of-war were repatriated and by
25 February 1966 their forces had withdrawn to their pre-5 August. However,
respecting the ‘spirit’ of the Declaration (resolving
disputes peacefully, promoting friendly relations) proved more difficult

Pakistan welcomes mediation, pressure, facilitation,
encouragement or any such other role of the United States and the rest of the international
community in resolving the Kashmir issue, Khurshid M Kasuri, the Pakistani
foreign minister. But always opposed the US’ role as mediator, because India
will not concede to direct US intervention on Kashmir since it sees itself as a
contending great power.

 

 

 

 

4. Conclusion

As we see the record of the mediation on the Kashmir issue, we conclude that
Pakistan has always been seeking for the Third-party involvement (mediation)
over Kashmir issue with India. That we
conclude that from the certain statements of Pakistani’s leaders, like The
Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, started his official working visit to the
United States by saying that to have peace in South Asia, it was critical for
the Kashmir issue to be resolved; and that it could not be done unless there
was third-party mediation or facilitation. Bilateralism has failed and,
therefore, there is a requirement for mediation or facilitation in resolving
the disputes between India and Pakistan. Khurshid M Kasuri, the Pakistani
foreign minister, said Pakistan welcomes mediation, pressure, facilitation,
encouragement or any such other role of the United States and the rest of the international
community in resolving the Kashmir issue. India will not concede to direct US intervention
on Kashmir since it sees itself as a contending great power and also says
mediation on
Kashmir dispute as degrading India’ independence while as the same time
jeopardizing its integrity. India itself considers as “Tiger of Asia”
and “regional superpower of the South Asia”. She is in good position
to negotiate on the bilateral channel. India did not want to expose the Kashmir
Dispute on the international arena but rather saw it the internal affair of
her. She always has been violating the Human Rights of the people of Kashmir
and not employs the UN’s resolution of “self-determination” and
plebiscite in the Kashmir.  I concluded
that the role of Third-party or mediation is much required in this time.
Pakistan, being the frontline state in the war against terrorism state, it is
the heydays that Pakistan should be persuaded
the international community and especially to the USA to mediate and will play
the role of the Third-Party over the Kashmir Issue with India.

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